I develop a highly tractable general equilibrium model in which heterogeneous producers face collateral constraints, and study the effect of financial frictions on capital misallocation and aggregate productivity. My economy is isomorphic to a Solow model but with time-varying TFP. I argue that the persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks determines both the size of steady state productivity losses and the speed of transitions: if shocks are persistent, steady state losses are small but transitions are slow. Even if financial frictions are unimportant in the long-run, they tend to matter in the short-run and analyzing steady states only can be misleading.
Introduction
Underdeveloped countries often have underdeveloped financial markets. This can lead to an inefficient allocation of capital, in turn translating into low productivity and per-capita income. But available theories of this mechanism often ignore the effects of financial frictions on the accumulation of capital and wealth. Even if an entrepreneur is not able to acquire capital in the market, he might just accumulate it out of his own savings. A few existing theories do take into account accumulation, but almost all of them focus on long-run steady states only.
1 The implications of such effects -especially for transition dynamics -are therefore not well understood. To explore them, this paper develops a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model in which heterogeneous producers face collateral constraints.
Consider an entrepreneur who begins with a business idea. In order to develop his idea, he requires some capital and labor. The quality of his idea translates into his productivity in using these resources. He hires workers in a competitive labor market. Access to capital is more difficult, due to borrowing constraints: the entrepreneur is relatively poor and hence lacks the collateral required for taking out a loan. Now consider a country with many such entrepreneurs: some poor, some rich; some with great business ideas, others with ideas not worth implementing. In a country with well-functioning credit markets, only the most productive entrepreneurs would run businesses, while unproductive entrepreneurs would lend their money to the more productive ones. In practice credit markets are imperfect so the equilibrium allocation instead has the features that the marginal product of capital in a good entrepreneur's operation exceeds the marginal product elsewhere. Reallocating capital to him from another entrepreneur with a low marginal product would increase the country's GDP. Failure to reallocate is therefore referred to as a "misallocation" of capital. Such a misallocation of capital shows up in aggregate data as low total factor productivity (TFP). Financial frictions thus have the potential to help explain differences in per-capita income.
2
Of course, resources other than capital can also be misallocated. I focus on the misallocation of capital because there is empirical evidence that this is a particularly acute problem in developing countries.
3
The argument just laid out has ignored the fact that capital and other assets can be accumulated over time. Importantly, it has therefore also ignored the possibility of selffinancing: an entrepreneur without access to external funds can still accumulate internal funds over time to substitute for the lack of external funds.
4 Such self-financing therefore 1 A notable exception is Buera and Shin (2010) . See the "Related Literature" section at the end of this introduction for a more detailed discussion. Understanding transition dynamics is important because they have the potential to explain observed growth episodes such as the growth of the post-war miracle economies.
2 See Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) for the argument that resource misallocation shows up as low TFP. See Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for a similar argument and empirical evidence on misallocation in China and India. See Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999) for the argument that cross-country income differences are primarily accounted for by low TFP in developing countries.
3 I refer the reader to Banerjee and Duflo (2005) , Banerjee and Moll (2010) and the references cited therein.
4 See the survey by Quadrini (2009) for the argument that such self-financing motives can explain the high concentration of wealth among entrepreneurial households. In the same spirit, Gentry and Hubbard (2004) and Buera (2009) find that entrepreneurial households have higher savings rates and argue that this is due to costly external financing for entrepreneurial investment. Gentry and Hubbard remark that similar ideas go 2007; Quintin, 2008; Amaral and Quintin, 2010; Buera and Shin, 2010; Midrigan and Xu, 2010; Buera, Kaboski and Shin, 2011) . With the exception of Jeong and Townsend (2007) and Buera and Shin (2010) , all of these papers focus on steady states.
9 And all of them feature purely quantitative exercises. As a result, relatively little is known about transition dynamics and how various aspects of the environment affect the papers' quantitative results.
In contrast, my paper offers a tractable theory of aggregate dynamics that I use to highlight the role played by the persistence of productivity shocks in determining the size of productivity losses from financial frictions, particularly the differential implications of persistence for both steady states and transition dynamics.
In the existing quantitative literature on steady state productivity losses from financial frictions, there also remains some disagreement on the size of resulting productivity losses. For example, Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) calibrate a model of entrepreneurship similar to the one in this paper and argue that financial frictions can explain TFP losses of up to 40%. On the other extreme, Midrigan and Xu (2010) calibrate a very similar model to plant-level panel data from South Korea but conclude that for the specific data set they study, these frictions only account for relatively small TFP losses of 5 − 7%.
10 To better explore the sources of such disagreement is an additional goal of my paper. Much of the disagreement in the two papers can likely be attributed to different specifications and parameterizations of the stochastic process of productivity of entrepreneurs, particularly the persistence (appropriately defined). This is because TFP turns out to be a "steep" function of persistence for high values of the latter so that similar values of persistence may be quite far apart from each other in terms of TFP losses. Note again that both Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) and Midrigan and Xu (2010) examine steady states only, and may therefore miss some interesting transition dynamics. In light of my finding that transition dynamics 9 My paper is complementary to Buera and Shin (2010) , but differs along two dimensions. First, my model is highly tractable, whereas their analysis is purely numerical, though in a somewhat more general framework with decreasing returns and occupational choice. Second, they do not discuss the sensitivity of their results with respect to the persistence of shocks. In a follow-up paper, do examine the sensitivity of steady state productivity (and also welfare) losses to persistence, but not how it affects the speed of or productivity losses during transitions. My paper also differs from Jeong and Townsend (2007) in various respects. Among other differences, their model features overlapping generations of two-period lived individuals. Hence individuals are constrained to adjust their savings only once during their entire lifetime, which may be problematic for quantitative results if the self-financing mechanism described earlier in this introduction is potent in reality. See Giné and Townsend (2004) ; Jeong and Townsend (2008) ; Townsend (2009) for more on transition dynamics. See Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2008) for another tractable model of finance and TFP with overlapping generations.
10 The authors stress that this is (in their words) "not an impossibility result"; rather that parameterizations that do generate large TFP losses miss important features of the data. Also note that both their paper and Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) differ from mine in some modeling choices: Both papers assume decreasing returns in production whereas I assume constant returns. Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) feature fixed costs, occupational choice and two sectors of production, all of which are not present in my paper.
are typically slow when steady state productivity losses are small, this is particularly true for Midrigan and Xu.
To deliver my model's tractability, I build on work by Angeletos (2007) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) . Their insight is that heterogenous agent economies remain tractable if individual production functions feature constant returns to scale because then individual policy rules are linear in individual wealth. In contrast to the present paper, Angeletos focuses on the role of incomplete marketsà la Bewley and does not not examine credit constraints (only the so-called natural borrowing limit). Kiyotaki and Moore analyze a similar setup with borrowing constraints but focus on aggregate fluctuations. Both papers assume that productivity shocks are iid over time, an assumption I dispense with. Note that this is not a minor difference: allowing for persistent shocks is on one hand considerably more challenging technically, but also changes results dramatically. Assuming iid shocks in my model, would lead one to miss most interesting transition dynamics. Persistent shocks are, of course, also the empirically relevant assumption. A notable exception allowing for persistent shocks is Kiyotaki (1998) . His persistence, however, comes in form of a Markov chain with only two states (productive and unproductive) which is considerably less general than in my paper.
11 Finally, I contribute to broader work on the macroeconomic effects of micro distortions (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2012) . Hsieh and Klenow (2009) in particular argue that misallocation of both capital and labor substantially lowers aggregate TFP in India and China. Their analysis makes use of abstract "wedges" between marginal products. In contrast, I formally model one reason for such misallocation: financial frictions resulting in a misallocation of capital. After developing my model (Section 1), I demonstrate the importance of the persistence for productivity shocks (Section 2). Section 3 is a conclusion.
Model

Preferences and Technology
Time is continuous. There is a continuum of entrepreneurs that are indexed by their productivity z and their wealth a. Productivity z follows some Markov process (the exact process 11 Another similarity between my paper and Kiyotaki (1998) is the characterization of equilibrium in terms of the share of wealth of a given productivity type. Other papers exploiting linear savings policy rules in environments with heterogenous agents are Banerjee and Newman (2003) ; Azariadis and Kaas (2009); Kocherlakota (2009) and Krebs (2003) . Benabou (2002) shows that even with non-constant returns, it is possible to retain tractability in heterogenous agent economies by combining loglinear individual technologies with log-normally distributed shocks, thereby allowing him to study issues of redistribution. In my model with constant returns to scale in both the production and capital accumulation technologies, there is no motive for progressive redistribution (except possibly the provision of insurance).
is irrelevant for now).
12 I assume a law of large numbers so the share of entrepreneurs experiencing any particular sequence of shocks is deterministic. At each point in time t, the state of the economy is then the joint distribution g t (a, z). The corresponding marginal distributions are denoted by ϕ t (a) and ψ t (z). Entrepreneurs have preferences
Each entrepreneur owns a private firm which uses k units of capital and l units of labor to produce
units of output, where α ∈ (0, 1). Capital depreciates at the rate δ. There is also a mass L of workers. Each worker is endowed with one efficiency unit of labor which he supplies inelastically. Workers have the same preferences as (1) with the exception that they face no uncertainty so the expectation is redundant. The assumption of logarithmic utility makes analytical characterization easier but can be generalized to CRRA utility at the expense of some extra notation. See also Buera and Moll (2012) who analyze a similar setup with CRRA utility. 
Budgets
Entrepreneurs hire workers in a competitive labor market at a wage w(t). They also rent capital from other entrepreneurs in a competitive capital rental market at a rental rate R(t). This rental rate equals the user cost of capital, that is R(t) = r(t) + δ where r(t) is the interest rate and δ the depreciation rate. An entrepreneurs' wealth, denoted by a(t), then evolves according toȧ
Savingsȧ equal profits -output minus payments to labor and capital -plus interest income minus consumption. The setup with a rental market is chosen solely for simplicity. I show in Appendix B that it is equivalent to a setup in which entrepreneurs own and accumulate capital k and can trade in a risk-free bond. See also Buera and Moll (2012) who analyze such a setup.
12 Here, "productivity" is a stand-in term for a variety of factors such as entrepreneurial ability, an idea for a new product, an investment "opportunity", but also demand side factor such as idiosyncratic demand shocks.
13 Results for the case of CRRA utility in the present framework (mostly numerical but also some theoretical) are available upon request. All results are quantitatively similar for values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution that are not too far away from one.
Entrepreneurs face collateral constraints
This formulation of capital market imperfections is analytically convenient. Moreover, by placing a restriction on an entrepreneur's leverage ratio k/a, it captures the common intuition that the amount of capital available to an entrepreneur is limited by his personal assets. Different underlying frictions can give rise to such collateral constraints. 14 Finally, note that by varying λ, I can trace out all degrees of efficiency of capital markets; λ = ∞ corresponds to a perfect capital market, and λ = 1 to the case where it is completely shut down. λ therefore captures the degree of financial development, and one can give it an institutional interpretation. The form of the constraint (4) is more restrictive than required to derive my results, a point I discuss in more detail in section 1.7. I show there that all my theoretical results go through with slight modification for the case where the maximum leverage ratio λ is an arbitrary function of productivity so that (4) becomes k ≤ λ(z)a. The maximum leverage ratio may also depend on the interest rate and wages, calendar time and other aggregate variables. What is crucial is that the collateral constraint is linear in wealth. Entrepreneurs are allowed to hold negative wealth, but I show below that they never find it optimal to do so. I assume that workers cannot save so that they are in effect hand-to-mouth workers who immediately consume their earnings. Workers can therefore be omitted from the remainder of the analysis.
15
14 For example, the constraint can be motivated as arising from a limited enforcement problem. Consider an entrepreneur with wealth a who rents k units of capital. The entrepreneur can steal a fraction 1/λ of rented capital. As a punishment, he would lose his wealth. In equilibrium, the financial intermediary will rent capital up to the point where individuals would have an incentive to steal the rented capital, implying a collateral constraint k/λ ≤ a or k ≤ λa. See Banerjee and Newman (2003) and Buera and Shin (2010) for a similar motivation of the same form of constraint. Note, however, that the constraint is essentially static because it rules out optimal long term contracts (as in Kehoe and Levine, 2001 , for example). On the other hand, as Banerjee and Newman put it "there is no reason to believe that more complex contracts will eliminate the imperfection altogether, nor diminish the importance of current wealth in limiting investment."
15 A more natural assumption can be made when one is only interested in the economy's long-run equilibrium. Allow workers to save so that their wealth evolves asȧ = w + ra − c, but impose that they cannot hold negative wealth, a(t) ≥ 0 for all t. Workers then face a standard deterministic savings problem so that they decumulate wealth whenever the interest rate is smaller than the rate of time preference, r < ρ. It turns out that the steady state equilibrium interest rate always satisfies this inequality (see corollary 1). Together with the constraint that a(t) ≥ 0, this immediately implies that workers hold zero wealth in the long-run. Therefore, even if I allowed workers to save, in the long-run they would endogenously choose to be hand-to-mouth workers. Alternatively, one can extend the model to the case where workers face labor income risk and therefore save in equilibrium even if r < ρ. Numerical results for both cases are available upon request. Also see Buera and Moll (2012) . 8
Individual Behavior
Entrepreneurs maximize the present discounted value of utility from consumption (1) subject to their budget constraints (3). Their production and savings/consumption decisions separate in a convenient way. Define the profit function
Note that profits depend on wealth a due to the presence of the collateral constraints (4). The budget constraint (3) can now be rewritten aṡ
The interpretation is that entrepreneurs solve a static profit maximization problem period by period. They then decide to split those profits (plus interest income ra) between consumption and savings.
Lemma 1 Factor demands and profits are linear in wealth, and there is a productivity cutoff for being active z:
The productivity cutoff is defined by zπ = r + δ.
(All proofs are in the Appendix.) Both the linearity and cutoff properties follow directly from the fact that individual technologies (2) display constant returns to scale in capital and labor. Maximizing out over labor in (5), profits are linear in capital, k. It follows that the optimal capital choice is at a corner: it is zero for entrepreneurs with low productivity, and the maximal amount allowed by the collateral constraints, λa, for those with high productivity.
The productivity of the marginal entrepreneur is z. For him, the return on one unit of capital zπ equals the cost of acquiring that unit r + δ. The linearity of profits and factor demands delivers much of the tractability of my model. In particular it implies a law of motion for wealth that is linear in wealtḣ
This linearity allows me to derive a closed form solution for the optimal savings policy function.
Lemma 2 The optimal savings policy function is linear in wealtḣ
is the savings rate of productivity type z.
Importantly, savings are characterized by a constant savings rate out of wealth. This is a direct consequence of the assumption of log utility combined with the linearity of profits. Note also that the linear savings policy implies that entrepreneurs never find it optimal to let their wealth go negative, a(t) ≥ 0 for all t, even though this was not imposed.
Equilibrium and Aggregate Dynamics
An equilibrium in this economy is defined in the usual way. That is, an equilibrium is time paths for prices r(t), w(t), t ≥ 0 and corresponding quantities, such that (i) entrepreneurs maximize (1) subject to (3) taking as given equilibrium prices, and (ii) the capital and labor markets clear at each point in time
The goal of this subsection is to characterize such an equilibrium. The following object will be convenient for this task and throughout the remainder of the paper. Define the share of wealth held by productivity type z by
where K(t) ≡ adG t (a, z) is the aggregate capital stock. See Kiyotaki (1998) and Caselli and Gennaioli (2005) for other papers using wealth shares to characterize aggregates. As will become clear momentarily ω(z, t) plays the role of a density. It is therefore also useful to define the analogue of the corresponding cumulative distribution function
Consider the capital market clearing condition (7). Using that k = λa, for all active entrepreneurs (z ≥ z), it becomes
Given wealth shares, this equation immediately pins down the threshold z as a function of the quality of credit markets λ. Similarly, we can derive the law of motion for aggregate capital by integrating (6) over all entrepreneurs. Using the definition of the wealth shares (9), we getK
Using similar manipulations, we obtain our first main result.
Proposition 1 Given a time path for wealth shares ω(z, t), t ≥ 0, aggregate quantities satisfy
where K and L are aggregate capital and labor and
is measured TFP. The productivity cutoff z is defined by
Factor prices are
The interpretation of this result is straightforward. In terms of aggregate GDP, this economy is isomorphic to one with an aggregate production function, Y = ZK α L 1−α . The sole difference is that TFP Z(t) is endogenous and as in (13). TFP is simply a weighted average of the productivities of active entrepreneurs (those with productivity z ≥ z). As already discussed, (14) is the capital market clearing condition. Because Ω(·, t) is increasing, it can be seen that the productivity threshold for being an active entrepreneur is strictly increasing in the quality of credit markets λ. This implies that, as credit markets improve, the number of active entrepreneurs decreases and their average productivity increases. Because truncated expectations such as (13) are increasing in the point of truncation, it follows that TFP is always increasing in λ (for given wealth shares).
Condition (12) gives a simple law of motion for the aggregate savings. The key to this aggregation result is that individual savings policy rules are linear as shown in Lemma 1.
This law of motion can be written aṡ
are constant savings and depreciation rates. This is the same law of motion as in the classic paper by Solow (1956) . What is surprising about this observation is that the starting point of this paper -heterogenous entrepreneurs that are subject to borrowing constraints -is very far from an aggregate growth model such as Solow's. 16 One twist differentiates the model from an aggregate growth model: TFP Z(t) is endogenous. It is determined by the quality of credit markets and the evolution of the distribution of wealth as summarized by the wealth shares ω(z, t). I show in section 1.6 below that, given a stochastic process for idiosyncratic productivity z, one can construct a time path for the wealth shares ω(z, t). In turn, a time path for TFP Z(t) is implied. But given this evolution of TFP -says Proposition 1 -aggregate capital and output behave as in an aggregate growth model. One immediate implication of interest is that financial frictions as measured by the parameter λ have no direct effects on aggregate savings; they only affect savings indirectly through TFP. This result is discussed in more detail by Buera and Moll (2012) in the context of business cycle fluctuations driven by fluctuations in financial frictions. That paper also provides a detailed intuition for the result and shows that it is not -as one may conjecture -a knife-edge result that relies only on the assumptions of log utility or that workers cannot save in the present paper.
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The wage rate in (15) simply equals the aggregate marginal product of labor. This is to be expected since labor markets are frictionless and hence individual marginal products are equalized among each other and also equal the aggregate marginal product. The same is not true for the rental rate R. It equals the aggregate marginal product of capital αZK
scaled by a constant ζ that is generally smaller than one. ζ only equals one if λ = ∞ so that only the most productive entrepreneur is active, z = max{z}, implying that the first-best is achieved (of course, the support of z must also be finite so that max{z} exists). In all other cases, ζ < 1 so that the rental rate is lower than the aggregate marginal product of capital. In the extreme case where capital markets are completely shut down, λ = 1, the rental rate equals the return on capital of the least productive entrepreneur (typically zero).
The rental rate R = r + δ is also the return on capital faced by a hypothetical investor outside the economy. The observation that rental rates are low, therefore also speaks to the classic question of Lucas (1990) : "Why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries?"
It may be precisely capital market imperfections within poor countries that bring down the return on capital thereby limiting capital flows from rich countries. That financial frictions break the link between the interest rate and the aggregate marginal product of capital also has some implications for the dynamic behavior of the interest rate r(t). I will highlight one of those when discussing transition dynamics in section 4, namely that -in contrast to transition dynamics in the neoclassical growth model -it is possible for both the interest rate and the capital stock to be growing at the same time.
Steady State Equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium satisfying
Imposing these restrictions in Proposition 1 yields the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 1 Given stationary wealth shares ω(z), aggregate steady state quantities solve
is measured TFP. The productivity cutoff z is defined by λ(1 − Ω(z)) = 1. Factor prices are
Most expressions have exactly the same interpretation as in the dynamic equilibrium above.
(18) says that the aggregate steady state capital stock in the economy solves a condition 18 Note that, although there is a steady state for aggregates, there is no steady state for the joint distribution of productivity and wealth g t (a, z). The same phenomenon occurs in the papers by Krebs (2003) and Angeletos (2007) . The reason is that the growth rate of wealth s(z) is stochastic and does not depend on wealth itself (the log of wealth therefore follows something resembling a random walk). However, wealth shares ω(z, t) still allow for a stationary measure ω(z). Stationary wealth shares are then defined by
where the reader should note the t subscript on the joint distribution but not on the wealth shares. I argue in the end of section 1.6 that the model can easily be extended to feature a stationary wealth distribution by introducing "death shocks", and that this extension generates a "power law Kuznets curve" for wealth inequality.
that is precisely the same as in a standard neoclassical, namely that the aggregate marginal product of capital equals the sum of the rate of time preference and the depreciation rate.
Condition (18) further implies that the capital-output ratio in this economy is given by
which is again the same expression as in a standard neoclassical growth model. The capitaloutput ratio does not depend on the quality of credit markets, λ. This is consistent with the finding in the development accounting literature that capital-output ratios explain only a relatively modest fraction of cross-country income differences (Hall and Jones, 1999) . 
The Evolution of Wealth Shares
The description of equilibrium so far has taken as given the evolution of wealth shares ω(z, t).
The statements in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 were of the form: given a time path for
is true. This section fills in for the missing piece and explains how to characterize the evolution of wealth shares. Note first that the evolution of wealth shares ω(z, t) and hence TFP losses from financial frictions depend crucially on the assumptions placed on the stochastic process for idiosyncratic productivity z. Consider the extreme example where each entrepreneur's productivity is fixed z(t) = z for all t. In this case, financial frictions will have no effect on aggregate TFP asymptotically. To see this, consider the optimal savings policy function,ȧ(t) = s(z)a(t) (see Lemma 2), and note that the savings rate s(z) is increasing in productivity z. Since productivity is fixed over time, the entrepreneurs with the highest productivity max{z} will always accumulate at a faster pace than others. In the long run (as t → ∞), the most productive entrepreneur will therefore hold all the wealth in the economy, implying that his stationary wealth share is one,
It follows immediately that TFP Z(t) → max{z} α as t → ∞. Steady state TFP and GDP are first-best regardless of the quality of credit markets, λ. The interpretation of this result 19 Hall and Jones (1999) do present evidence that capital-output ratios are higher in notably richer countries so my result that they do not vary across countries is a bit extreme. However, as argued by Hsieh and Klenow (2007) , low investment rates in poor are due to low efficiency in producing investment goods rather than low savings rates. Therefore investment rates -which in my model equal I/Y = δK/Y = δα/(ρ + δ) -differ much less across countries when evaluated at domestic rather than PPP prices. The same is true for capital-output ratios (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007) . is that, asymptotically, self-financing completely undoes all capital misallocation caused by financial frictions.
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If productivity z follows a non-degenerate stochastic process, this is -in general -no longer true. On the opposite extreme of fixed productivities, consider the case where productivity shocks are assumed to be iid over time as in Angeletos (2007) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) .
21 In this case, wealth and productivity will be independent g t (a, z) = ϕ t (a)ψ(z) because iid shocks imply that productivity shocks are unpredictable at the time when savings decisions are made. It follows directly from the definition of the stationary wealth shares in (23) that ω(z, t) = ψ(z) for all t. In this case, productivity losses will be large. The reason is that iid shocks assume away any possibility for entrepreneurs to self-finance their investments.
22 However, as I will argue in sections 2 and 3, the assumption of iid shocks is empirically irrelevant and would lead one to draw false conclusions for the steady state and transition dynamics of the model. In the intermediate range between the two extremes of fixed and iid productivity, things are more interesting. However, characterizing the evolution of wealth shares is also harder.
To make some headway for this case, I assume that productivity, z, follows a diffusion which is simply the continuous time version of a Markov process:
µ(z) is called the drift term and σ(z) the diffusion term. In addition, I assume that this diffusion allows for a stationary distribution. I would like to note here that other stochastic processes are also possible. For example, a version in which z follows a Poisson process is available upon request.
The following Proposition is the main tool for characterizing the evolution of wealth shares ω(z, t).
20 See Banerjee and Moll (2010) for a very similar result. Of course, the distribution of wealth and welfare will be different than those in the first-best allocation.
21 A continuous time setup is of course not very amenable to iid shocks. See the simpler discrete time setup with iid shocks in the online Appendix at http://www.princeton.edu/~moll/research.htm.
22 Note that this result also relies on the fact that my model features linear consumption and saving functions (Lemma 2) and hence no precautionary savings. This follows because utility functions are of the CRRA form and all risk is rate-of-return risk (Carroll and Kimball, 1996) . Departing from these assumptions, consumption functions would be strictly concave and hence precautionary savings would allow for partial self-financing.
23 Readers who are unfamiliar with stochastic processes in continuous time may want to read the simple discrete time setup with iid shocks in the online Appendix at http://www.princeton.edu/~moll/research. htm. The present setup in continuous time allows me to derive more general results, particularly with regard to the persistence of shocks which is the central theme in this paper.
Proposition 2 The wealth shares ω(z, t) obey the second order partial differential equation
The wealth shares must also be non-negative, bounded, continuous and once differentiable everywhere, integrate to one for all t ∞ 0 ω(z, t)dz = 1, and satisfy the initial condition
The stationary wealth shares ω(z) obey the second order ordinary differential equation
The stationary wealth shares must also be non-negative, bounded, continuous and once differentiable everywhere, and integrate to one,
24
This PDE and the related ODE are mathematically similar to the Kolmogorov forward equation used to keep track of cross-sectional distributions of diffusion processes. 25 Solving for the wealth shares also requires solving for equilibrium prices and aggregate quantities which satisfy the equilibrium conditions (11) to (15). See Appendix E, for a general algorithm for computing equilibria.
One feature of the model's steady state equilibria deserves further treatment. The stationary wealth shares in Corollary 1 and proposition 2 are defined by
Note that the joint distribution of productivity and wealth g t (a, z) carries a t subscript. The reason is that, while aggregates are constant in a steady state equilibrium, there is no steady state for the joint distribution of productivity and wealth g t (a, z). The same phenomenon occurs in the papers by Krebs (2003) and Angeletos (2007) . To understand this, note that the growth rate of wealth, that is the savings rate s(z), depends on (stochastic) productivity z but not on wealth itself. Wealth therefore follows a random growth process. This implies that the wealth distribution always "fans out" over time and does not admit a stationary 24 I here leave open the question of precise boundary conditions. These have to be determined on a case by case basis, depending on the particular process (20) one wishes to analyze. Below I provide a numerical example with a reflecting barrier providing a boundary condition, and two analytic examples in which one boundary condition can be replaced because the solution has two branches one of which can be set to zero because it explodes as z tends to infinity.
25 There is unfortunately no straightforward intuition for these equations so that readers who are unfamiliar with the related mathematics will have to take them at face value. For readers who are familiar with it: If the function s(z, t) −K(t)/K(t) were identically zero, these equations would coincide with the forward equation for the marginal distribution of productivities ψ(z, t). The term s(z, t) −K(t)/K(t) functions like a Poisson killing rate (however note that it generally takes both positive and negative values).
distribution. If the model were set up in discrete time, the log of wealth would follow a random walk which is the prototypical example of a process without a stationary distribution.
However, and despite the fact that the joint distribution g t (a, z) is non-stationary, the wealth shares ω(z, t) still admit a stationary measure ω(z) defined as in (23). This allows me to completely sidestep the nonexistence of a stationary wealth distribution.
It is relatively easy to extend the model in a way that allows for a stationary wealth distribution. In a brief note (Moll, 2012) , I show how this can be achieved by introducing "death shocks."
26 At a Poisson rate θ > 0 some entrepreneurs that are randomly selected from the entire population get replaced with new entrepreneurs who begin life with some finite wealth level. This introduces mean-reversion and ensures that a stationary distribution exists, even for arbitrarily small θ. An extension with a stationary wealth distribution features a stationary firm size distribution (from Lemma 1, employment of active entrepreneurs is proportional to wealth, l(a, z) ∝ zλa); and a stationary consumption distribution (from Lemma 2, consumption is proportional to wealth, c = ρa) so that consumption inequality and hence welfare can be analyzed.
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More General Formulations of the Credit Market Friction
Propositions 1 and 2 have been derived under the assumption that financial frictions take the form of the simple collateral constraint (4) that places the same common limit on the leverage ratio of all entrepreneurs. This assumption, which was made for simplicity, is more restrictive than necessary and my results generalize to a number of more general formulations of the credit market friction. For instance, some readers may feel that it is more natural for the borrowing limit to depend on an entrepreneur's productivity so that (4) generalizes to
I here show that Propositions 1 and 2 go through with slight modification for the case where λ is an arbitrary function (which may even be non-monotonic or discontinuous). To this end, define the following modified credit market quality and wealth shares
To cover the case where borrowing constraints take the form (24), we can modify Proposition 1 as follows: simply replace λ byλ(t) and ω(z, t) byω(z, t). This is easy to show following the same steps as in the proof of the original Proposition so stated without proof. Similarly, in Proposition 2 only the definition of the savings rate needs to be changed tõ
The maximum leverage ratio may also depend on the interest rate (or the wage). A simple example, in which it additionally depends on productivity, is as follows. An entrepreneur can avoid paying the interest on the loan, (r + δ)(k − a), by incurring a cost which equals a fraction η ∈ (0, 1) of firm profits net of wages, zπk. Then, assuming r +δ > ηπz, investments satisfy ηπzk ≥ (k − a)(r + δ) so that
Again, using definitions analogous to (25) 
The Importance of Persistence
The main purpose of this section is to illustrate the role played by the persistence of productivity in determining productivity losses from financial frictions, both in steady state and during transitions. To make some headway, I first specialize the stochastic process (20) and choose some particular values for the model's parameters. I then show that steady state TFP losses are small when shocks are persistent and vice versa; and next that the case with persistent shocks and small steady state TFP losses is precisely the case in which transitions to steady state are typically very slow.
My results are numerical. I would, however, like to emphasize that solving for an equilibrium boils down to solving a single partial differential equation, (21). This can be done very efficiently and I therefore view my approach as an improvement over existing techniques for computing transition dynamics in this class of models. In contrast, other papers with persistent shocks and forward-looking savings have to resort to considerably more complicated numerical techniques. See the discussion in footnote 7. My numerical algorithm is described in Appendix E. For steady states only and in the extreme case of no capital markets, λ = 1, it is actually possible to derive some closed form results and I will return to these in section 2.3 below.
A Mean-Reverting Stochastic Process
I assume that the logarithm of productivity follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
where ν and σ are positive parameters. An attractive feature of this process is that it is the exact continuous-time equivalent of a discrete-time AR(1) process for which many good estimates are available from the literature (Gourio, 2008; Collard-Wexler, Asker and DeLoecker, 2011) . Some key properties are as follows: the stationary distribution is lognormal with mean and variance
That is
The autocorrelation and conditional variance are (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) Corr(log z(t), log z(t + s)) = e −νs ∈ (0, 1]
Two intuitive observations can be made. First, the autocorrelation is smaller the bigger is the distance in time between the two observations, s. Second, the autocorrelation is high if the speed of mean reversion ν is low. Taking the limit as ν → ∞, we can obtain the case Corr[log z(t), log z(t + s)] = 0. This limit therefore corresponds to the case where productivity shocks are iid over time. I further impose an upper bound on productivity in the form of a reflecting barrier.
This bound is needed because any computations necessarily require productivity to lie in a bounded interval. 28 It also has the advantage that the first-best, namely allocating all resources to the most productive entrepreneur, is well-defined. I impose an upper boundz and assume that the process (28) is reflected at this upper bound. The boundary condition corresponding to such a reflecting barrier is Table 2 ). Most of my experiments compare this benchmark parameterization to one with different ν and σ.
The exact value for the upper bound on productivityz is somewhat arbitrary. I below set it equal to the 95th percentile of a log-normal distribution with mean and variance as in (29), i.e. the 95th percentile of the stationary productivity distribution if there were no upper bound. Finally, the parameter λ that governs the degree of financial development can be disciplined with external finance to GDP ratios as in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) .
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This is possible because these external finance to GDP ratios have a direct counterpart in my 29 See for example Wong (1964) . The boundary condition can be motivated from the requirement that wealth shares integrate to one, z 0 ω(z, t)dz = 1. Because this total mass has to be preserved for all t, the law of motion for wealth shares (21) implies that
Using ω(0, t) = 0 for all t, we obtain (32). 30 With the reflecting barrier, the stationary distribution is still log-normal but rescaled to integrate to one between zero and the reflecting barrier.
31 External finance is defined to be the sum of private credit, private bond market capitalization, and stock market capitalization. This definition follows Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) . See also their footnote 9. Note: λ is calculated from (33), assuming that α = 1/3, ρ = 0.05, δ = 0.05 (implying that K/Y = 3.33). External-finance to GDP ratios are from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) .
model. The model predicts that the ratio of external finance to capital in a given economy
If there are no capital markets, λ = 1, there is no external finance: D/K = 0. If capital markets are perfect, λ = ∞, the entire capital stock of the economy is financed externally:
Together with the expression for the capital output ratio (19) this implies that the steady state external finance to GDP ratio equals 
Results: Steady States
Figure 1 graphs TFP against the parameter capturing the quality of credit markets, λ, and autocorrelation, Corr(log z(t + 1), log z(t)) = e −ν . Panel (a) displays a three dimensional graph, and panel (b) the corresponding cross-section of TFP plotted against λ for selected autocorrelations. In order to give some theoretically meaningful units to TFP numbers below, I normalize them by the first-best TFP level,z α . 33 Three observations can be made.
First, TFP losses are smaller the more correlated are productivity shocks. Second, TFP is a very "steep" function of autocorrelation for high values of the latter. Third, the same is not true for low values of autocorrelation for which TFP is relatively "flat" (that is, TFP is convex as a function of autocorrelation).
32 To see this note that all active entrepreneurs borrow as much as they can, that is individual borrowing is d = (λ − 1)a if z ≥ z and all inactive entrepreneurs lend. Total borrowing in the economy therefore equals D = E[d|d ≥ 0] = (λ − 1)(1 − Ω(z))K = (λ − 1)/λK where the last equality uses the market clearing condition λ(1 − Ω(z)) = 1.
33 I prefer this strategy to the alternative of normalizing TFP numbers by the TFP level for a high value of λ (say ten) for the reasons discussed in Appendix D. To understand why high persistence implies low TFP losses, it is useful to examine the stationary wealth shares, ω(z), for a given λ and to contrast them with the stationary productivity distribution, ψ(z), in (30). I conduct the following experiment: vary the parameter governing the autocorrelation ν while holding constant the distribution ψ(z) and particularly its variance σ 2 /(2ν). 34 Figure 2 plots the wealth shares ω(z) relative to the distribution ψ(z)
for different values of Corr[log z(t), log z(t + 1)] = exp(−ν). Two observations can be made:
First, the wealth shares ω(z) generally place more mass on higher productivity types (in the sense of first order stochastic dominance). This is because for any positive autocorrelation, there is some scope for self-financing so that higher productivity types accumulate more wealth. Second, wealth is more concentrated with higher productivity types, the higher is the autocorrelation of productivity shocks. To restate the same point in a slightly different manner, note that
Taking the limit as the autocorrelation goes to zero implies that we are in an environment where shocks are iid over time. In this case, and as discussed in section 2, wealth and productivity will be independent and hence ω(z) = ψ(z). As we increase the autocorrelation of productivity shocks above zero, self-financing becomes more and more feasible and wealth 34 The following example should clarify: suppose instead that (the logarithm of) productivity follows a discrete time AR(1) process, log z t = ρ log z t−1 + σε t . The stationary distribution of this process is a normal distribution with mean zero, and variance (22) for the stochastic process (28). As autocorrelation increases (equivalently ν decreases), wealth becomes more concentrated with high productivity entrepreneurs.
becomes more and more concentrated among high productivity types. Only relatively persistent shocks allow for wealth accumulation and hence for self-financing to function as a substitute to credit access.
As already noted, TFP in Figure 1 is highly sensitive to the autocorrelation of shocks for low values of the latter. That is, in terms of TFP losses an autocorrelation of, say, .95 is relatively far apart from one of .99. For instance, in the extreme case of no capital markets, λ = 1, the TFP losses with Corr = .95 are 26 percent whereas with Corr = .99 they are only 16.6 percent.
This "steepness" of TFP with respect to persistence potentially allows for a reconciliation of some of the very different quantitative results in the literature. For instance, Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) argue that financial frictions can explain productivity losses of up to 40% whereas Midrigan and Xu (2010) conclude that these frictions only account for relatively small losses of 5 − 7%. One main difference between the two papers lies in the form and calibration of the productivity process faced by entrepreneurs. Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) assume that every period entrepreneurs get a new productivity draw from an exogenous distribution with some probability. In contrast, Midrigan and Xu (2010) work with a stochastic process that features both a permanent and a transitory component and in their calibration the permanent component accounts for two thirds of the cross-sectional variance of productivity. While neither of these two productivity processes is directly comparable to the one in the present paper, my analysis captures the logic that leads them to obtain such different numbers, namely that Midrigan and Xu's stochastic process features higher persistence (broadly defined) than the one of Buera et al. 35 When Midrigan and Xu instead calibrate a model without a permanent component and a transitory component with an autocorrelation of .92, the productivity losses they report increase to 18.1% (see their Table  5 ). 36 When they additionally lower the autocorrelation to 0.8, TFP losses increase further to 29.5%. Therefore their framework seems to display the same "steepness" as in my model so that similar values of persistence may be quite far apart from each other in terms of TFP losses.
My analysis has been numerical. As a brief aside, I would like to note that for alternatives 35 Note in particular that for the stochastic process (28) the limit as Corr = exp(−ν) → 1 (while holding constant V ar(log z) = σ 2 /(2ν)) means that individual productivities are fixed. This is therefore also the limiting case of Midrigan and Xu with only a permanent component, or the one in Buera et al. in which the probability of getting a new draw is zero. Similarly, my limit as Corr = exp(−ν) → 0 means that productivity shocks are iid over time. This corresponds to Midrigan and Xu's process with only a transitory component which is also iid, and Buera et al.'s process when new draws arrive with probability one.
36 These are productivity losses for an economy with the external-finance-to-GDP ratio of Colombia equal to .3. Unfortunately their table 5 does not report the TFP losses for an economy with no debt λ = 1. However, using a similar calculation as in Table 1 , the Colombian external-finance-to-GDP ratio implies that λ = 1.1 so their TFP losses corresponding to λ = 1 should be only slightly larger.
to the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (28) and in the extreme case of no capital markets, λ = 1, the differential equation for stationary wealth shares (22) can actually be solved in closed form. I provide two such closed-form examples in Appendix C to underline that the main result of this section -that high persistence results in low steady state productivity lossesalso holds under alternative specifications of the stochastic process (20).
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The main purpose of this section has been to illustrate the role of the persistence of productivity shocks for steady state capital misallocation and hence for TFP losses from financial frictions. I have demonstrated that even with no capital markets λ = 1 the firstbest capital allocation is attainable if productivity shocks are sufficiently persistent over time. Conversely, steady state TFP losses can be large if shocks are iid over time or close to that case.
Results: Transition Dynamics
Having examined how steady state productivity losses from financial frictions depend on the persistence of productivity shocks, I now turn to the transition dynamics of the model. I argue in this section that, if shocks are relatively persistent so that financial frictions are unimportant in the long-run steady state, they instead considerably slow down the transition to steady state. This is because any initial misallocation takes a long time to unwind. Conversely, transitory shocks result in large long-run productivity losses but a fast transition. Furthermore, if the initial joint distribution of productivity and wealth is sufficiently distorted, the case with persistent shocks and hence small long-run TFP losses, also turns out to be the case with large short-run TFP losses.
I compute transitions from an exogenously given initial joint distribution of ability and wealth, as summarized by the corresponding wealth shares, ω 0 (z). I find it convenient to parameterize the initial wealth shares as
This is the formula for a log-normal distribution with mean m and variance σ 2 /(2ν). With m = 0, this is also the stationary distribution of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (30), ω 0 (z) = ψ(z), meaning that wealth and ability are independent of each other at time zero. With m > 0, wealth shares place more mass on high ability types which is to say that wealth 37 Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain closed form solutions for the more general case, λ > 1, or for the transitions. Also, the stochastic processes under which closed form solutions can be obtained are empirically somewhat less plausible and harder to link to existing empirical estimates than the process (28). For instance, they are processes on the level rather than the logarithm of productivity. So as not to switch between different stochastic processes in the main text, I relegated the closed-form examples to Appendix C. Readers with a preference for closed-form solutions should still find them appealing. and ability are positively correlated. I first compute transition dynamics from a distorted initial allocation, in which wealth and ability are negatively correlated, m < 0. I then repeat the exercise for a relatively undistorted allocation and discuss which of the two cases is more relevant. Figure 3 displays the transition dynamics from such a distorted initial allocation, in particular wealth shares given by (34) with m = −0.5. I use the same parameters as in the preceding section and additionally set λ = 1.2, consistent with the external-finance-to-GDP ratio for India (see Table 1 Table 1 ). For the benchmark exercise (red), I use Corr = exp(−ν) = 0.85 and σ = 0.56. The lines for Corr = 0 and Corr = 0.97 vary ν while holding constant V ar(log z) = σ 2 /(2ν). Initial wealth shares are given by (34) with m = −0.5.
more protracted the more persistent are productivity shocks. With persistent shocks, the model generates persistent endogenous TFP dynamics while with iid shocks, TFP jumps immediately to its steady state value. 38 Furthermore, while TFP losses are smaller in the long-run the more persistent are productivity shocks, they are actually larger in the short-run. The larger short-run TFP losses with persistent shocks arise because the initial misallocation takes longer to unwind. Next, consider the transition dynamics of the capital stock, GDP and the interest rate in panels (b) to (d). Their dynamics are simply those that would arise in a standard growth model with exogenous TFP following the time paths in panel (a). For instance, consider the dynamics of the interest rate in panel (d). With iid shocks, TFP jumps immediately to its steady state value and hence interest rate dynamics are qualitatively identical to those in a growth model following a one-time permanent TFP increase: the interest rate declines monotonically throughout the transition. In contrast, with persistent shocks, TFP grows over a prolonged time period and hence the interest rate rises during early stages of the transition.
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My theory of endogenous TFP dynamics is potentially relevant for some observed realworld growth experiences. King and Rebelo (1993) have argued that a neoclassical growth model with constant (or no) exogenous TFP growth has no hope of explaining sustained growth as stemming from transitional dynamics. In particular, one generates extremely counterfactual implications for the time path of the interest rate. According to their calculations for example, if the neoclassical growth model were to explain the postwar growth experience of Japan, the interest rate in 1950 should have been around 500 percent. In contrast, Imrohoroglu (2006, 2007) 40 But note that only the version of the model with persistent shocks can generate these dynamics whereas the version with iid shocks cannot. To understand the difference in TFP dynamics in Figure 3 , it is instructive to examine 39 This is a statement about the slope of the interest rate time path; still some readers may wonder about its level, namely why real interest rates are negative. Interest rates are bounded below by −δ and negative real interest rates due to depressed credit demand are a common feature of models with collateral constraints (Buera and Shin, 2010; Buera, Kaboski and Shin, 2011; Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2011) . The particular form of the borrowing constraint (4) does matter. For instance, negative interest rates are less likely to occur if the maximum leverage ratio is decreasing in the interest rate as in the extension in section 1.7 (equation (27)). Even with the constraint (4), many alternative parameterizations feature positive interest rates.
40 See Table A1 in Chen, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2006) and Figure 9 in Chen, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2007) for the TFP growth rates they feed into their model. As in panel (a) of Figure 3 for the case Corr = 0.97, the Japanese TFP growth rate starts out positive in 1956 and then converges to zero towards 2000. My model has no aggregate uncertainty so cannot generate the deviations from trend that are features of the Japanese TFP time-path. But the underlying trend is similar to that generated by my model in terms of both magnitude and speed of transition. the evolution of the wealth shares ω(z, t). Figure 4 plots these for two values of the autocorrelation, Corr = 0 and Corr = 0.97. With iid shocks (panel (a)), productivities are reshuffled instantaneously and wealth shares jump to their steady state value (see footnote 38). That is, wealth shares and hence TFP do not change anymore after time zero. While convergence is instantaneous, wealth and ability are independent of each other in this steady state, resulting in a relatively distorted allocation and a low level of TFP. In contrast, with persistent shocks, wealth shares continue to change for a long time. Over time, they place more and more mass on higher productivity types, i.e. wealth gets more and more concentrated among these high productivity types. Finally, wealth shares converge to their steady state in which wealth and productivity are positively correlated. it takes a long time to attain this more efficient allocation because initial misallocation unwinds only slowly. Since TFP depends only on the wealth shares and the quality of credit markets, the slow dynamics of wealth shares immediately translate into slow TFP dynamics.
The example in Figure 3 had the feature that the parameterization with high long-run levels for all of TFP, capital and GDP was precisely the one with low short-run levels for these variables (i.e. in the Figure However, since wealth and ability are positively correlated in the initial distribution, steady state TFP is now lower than initial TFP. In contrast, with more persistent shocks, there is still some scope for self-financing to undo capital misallocation. Consequently, steady state TFP is higher than initial TFP. Note that, even if time paths for TFP no longer cross with relatively undistorted initial wealth shares, it is still true that TFP dynamics are more prolonged the more persistent are shocks. Depending on the particular transition experience one wants the model to capture, either the case with distorted or undistorted initial wealth shares may be appropriate. For example, Buera and Shin (2010) argue that the growth experiences of post-war miracle economies are best thought of as transition dynamics in a model with financial frictions, but after reforms that eliminate other idiosyncratic distortions in the economy, for example entry barrier and sector-and size-dependent policies. They argue that these pre-reform firm-specific distortions are positively correlated with firm-level productivity as in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) . The transition following the removal of these distortions then corresponds to a transition from a distorted initial joint distribution of ability and wealth.
Finally, in results not reported here due to space constraints, I have also computed With Corr = 0, wealth shares jump immediately to their steady state value which is just the stationary distribution of productivity shocks ψ(z), implying that productivity and wealth are independent in the cross-section. After time zero, wealth shares and hence TFP do not change anymore. In contrast, with Corr = 0.97 wealth shares continue to change for a long time. Over time, they place more and more mass on higher productivity types, i.e. wealth gets more and more concentrated among these high productivity types. Finally, wealth shares converge to their steady state in which wealth and productivity are positively correlated. Since TFP depends only on the wealth shares and the quality of credit markets, the slow transition of wealth shares immediately implies a slow transition of TFP. transition dynamics following an economy that starts out in steady state but then there is a "financial reform," that is λ increases (it can either jump on impact, increase gradually over time or a combination of the two cases). The same insights obtain.
Summary of Results
To summarize, consider the behavior of my model with a persistence parameter in the empirically relevant range, i.e. with an autocorrelation of, say, 0.75 to 0.97 (Gourio, 2008; Collard-Wexler, Asker and DeLoecker, 2011) . With such a level of persistence, financial frictions can matter in both the short-and the long-run. In the long-run, self-financing partly undoes capital misallocation and hence reduces TFP losses; but the "steepness" of steady state TFP for high values of autocorrelation (see Figure 1 ) means that even relatively persistent shocks can lead to sizable steady state TFP losses. At the same time, financial frictions provide a theory of endogenous TFP dynamics that result in prolonged transitions to steady state for capital and GDP. In contrast, the empirically irrelevant extremes of fixed productivities and iid shocks are potentially misleading but for completely different reasons: with fixed productivities self-financing completely undoes all capital misallocation in the long-run and TFP is first-best; in contrast, with iid shocks the model generates no endogenous TFP dynamics as TFP jumps immediately to its steady state value.
Concluding Remarks
In my framework, self-financing undoes capital misallocation from financial frictions in the long-run if idiosyncratic productivity shocks are relatively persistent. The reason is that entrepreneurs accumulate wealth out of past successes so only if high productivity episodes are sufficiently prolonged can they accumulate sufficient internal funds to self-finance their desired investments. As a result, the extent of steady state capital misallocation and therefore TFP losses from financial frictions are small with persistent shocks. However, the case in which steady state productivity losses are small is precisely the case in which transitions to this steady state take a very long time. This is because TFP endogenously evolves as capital misallocation slowly unwinds over time. Conversely, if shocks are transitory, steady state TFP losses are large but the transition to this steady state is fast. I have made this point in a heterogenous-agent model with borrowing constraints and forward-looking savings behavior. While featuring rich heterogeneity, the model remains highly tractable and TFP is simply a truncated weighted average of individual productivities, where the weights are the shares of wealth held by different productivity types. Solving for an equilibrium boils down to solving a single differential equation for these wealth shares (Proposition 2) which is a substantial improvement over commonly used solution techniques.
In contrast to similar existing theories, the model presented here also allows for persistent productivity shocks. The self-financing mechanism that takes center stage in my paper implies that any empirically serious theory of heterogenous firms and financial frictions must feature such persistence. The tools presented in this paper, particularly Proposition 2, could therefore also prove useful in other applications.
Appendix A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
From the profit maximization problem (5), optimal labor demand is l = (π/α) 1/(1−α) zk, where π is as in the Lemma. Plugging back in, the profit function becomes
Since this problem is linear, it follows immediately that k is either zero or λa. The cutoff z is defined as the value for which entrepreneurs are indifferent between running a firm and being inactive, Π(a, z) = 0.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From Lemma 1, we know thatȧ = A(z)a − c where A(z) = λ max{zπ − r − δ, 0} + r. The Bellman equation is then (see Ch.2 in Stokey, 2009) ,
The proof proceeds with a guess and verify strategy. Guess that the value function takes the form V (a, z) = v(z) + B log a. Using this guess we have that
Rewrite the value function
Take first order condition to obtain c = a/B. Substituting back in,
Collecting the terms involving log a, we see that B = 1/ρ so that c = ρa andȧ = [A(z) − ρ]a as claimed.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Throughout this proof, I omit indexing by t for notational simplicity. Using the expression for factor demands in Lemma 1, labor demand can be written as
and zero otherwise. It follows that individual output is y(a, z) = (π/α)λaz, if z ≥ z, and zero otherwise. Aggregate output is then
is an auxiliary variable. Next, consider the labor market clearing condition (35). Integrating over all a and z,
Substituting into (11), we see that Y = (λXK) α L 1−α . Eliminating λ using (14) this is (11) and (13) in the proposition.
Consider next the law of motion for aggregate capital (10). Using that the shares ω(z) integrate to one, we have thatK
Using capital market clearing (14),
Substituting (37) into (38) and rearranging, we geṫ
After substituting for λ from (14), this is equation (12) in Proposition 1. Substituting the definition of π from Lemma 1 into (37) and rearranging yields the expression for w. Substituting (37) into the cutoff condition zπ = R and rearranging yields the expression for R.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The law of motion for the joint distribution of wealth is given by the Kolmogorov Forward Equation (see for example Stokey, 2009, p.50) .
Using the definition of ω(z, t) we have that
Using an integration by parts
Plugging (39) into (40) and using (41), we obtain the PDE (21). Setting the time derivative equal to zero, one obtains the ODE (22). This proves all assertions in the theorem except for continuity and differentiability, which require more work and that I turn to now. Continuity and Differentiability of Wealth Shares: A difficulty arises because s(z) = λπ max{z − z, 0} + zπ − ρ is generally not differentiable at z = z. I here prove that despite this fact, ω(z) is continuous and once differentiable everywhere. The proof uses a discrete approximation. Consider a general diffusion
Under certain regularity conditions this diffusion can be approximated by a binomial tree specified as follows.
41 Divide time into discrete periods of length ∆t; start at some z; with probability p(z) the process moves up some distance ∆z and with probability q(z) = 1 − p(z) it moves down. The step size and probabilities are given by (equations 21-23 in Nelson and Ramaswamy)
As ∆t → 0, the resulting binomial process converges to the diffusion above. 42 Using the relationship between the time step and the grid size, the probabilities can also be written as
Next consider the savings behavior of and entrepreneur with productivity z: if he starts out with wealth a t at time t, he ends up with a t+∆t = s(z)∆ta t + a t at time t + ∆t. Next, consider the point (z, t + ∆t). This could have arisen in either of two ways: (z − ∆z, t) followed by an up move, or (z + ∆z, t) followed by a down move. Combining these two observations, the wealth held by entrepreneurs with ability z at time t + ∆t must satisfy
Continuity: Wealth shares at point (z − ∆z, t + ∆t) satisfy
Taking limits as ∆z → 0 in (43) yields lim x↑z ω(x, t) = 1 2 [lim x↑z ω(x, t) + ω(z, t)], or lim x↑z ω(x, t) = ω(z, t). A symmetric argument around the point (z + ∆z, t + ∆t) proves that lim x↓z ω(x, t) = ω(z, t), so that lim x↑z ω(x, t) = lim x↓z ω(x, t) = ω(z, t).
Differentiability: The proof proceeds by taking a first-order approximation in (43) around z. The approximation of ω(z − ∆z) is not straightforward. For any points z − ∆z and x < z,
Taking x to z, we have
where the second equality uses continuity from the first part of the proof. A similar approximation holds for ω(z + ∆z, t). Take a first-order approximation to all terms in (43) except to the terms involving s(z − ∆z) and s(z + ∆z):
Dropping all terms that are of order higher than ∆z, and rearranging
Importantly, the terms s(z − ∆z)∆t and s(z + ∆z)∆t always drop because they are of order higher than ∆z. Dividing by ∆z, taking limits as ∆z → 0, and using that p(z) and q(z) tend to 1/2 while p ′ (z) and q ′ (z) tend to zero, we get 0 = 1 2 [lim x↑z ω z (x, t) − lim x↓z ω z (x, t)], which immediately implies the differentiability condition.
B Equivalence between Renting and Owning/Accumulating Capital
Budget Constraints: I here show that the budget constraint (3) can be derived from a setup in which entrepreneurs own and accumulate capital themselves and trade in risk-free bonds. For sake of clarity, I present the argument for a discrete approximation to the continuous-time framework. Periods are of length ∆. The continuous-time counterparts of the expressions can be obtained by taking ∆ to zero. The stock of bonds issued by an entrepreneur, that is his debt, is denoted by d t . When d t < 0 the entrepreneur is a net lender. In order for there to be an interesting role for credit markets, an entrepreneur's productivity z t is revealed at the end of period t − ∆, before the entrepreneur issues his debt d t . That is, entrepreneurs can borrow to finance investment corresponding to their new productivity. The budget constraint and law of motion for capital are 0 = ∆(y t − w t l t − r t d t − x t+∆ − c t ) + d t+∆ − d t , k t+∆ = ∆x t+∆ + (1 − ∆δ)k t .
where x t+∆ investment in physical capital. These can be combined as k t+∆ − d t+∆ = ∆(y t − w t l t − δk t − rd t − c)
I now argue that by changing slightly the time at which the budget constraint is "recorded", we can derive the budget constraint (3). To this end, define d Entrepreneurs first observe their productivity z t , then issue debt d t to finance investment x t . The budget constraints (BC+) is recorded after investment x is made; (BC-) is recorded before investment is made. This amounts to moving the start of time t forward before investment is made. The two are equivalent. these definitions we can rewrite (BC+) as
(BC-)
Defining total wealth as a t ≡ k
, and collecting terms we get a t+∆ = ∆[y t − w t l t − (r t + δ)k t + ra t ] + a t . Rearranging, dividing by ∆ and letting ∆ tend to zero we obtain (3).
Borrowing Constraint: Similarly, there is a borrowing constraint for the above environment where entrepreneurs own and accumulate capital and trade in bonds, that is equivalent to (4):
This constraint says that only a fraction 1 − 1/λ of next period's capital stock can be externally financed (Note that this fraction is zero when λ = 1 and one when λ = ∞). Note the t + ∆ subscripts on both sides of the constraint. This is because both k t and d t are state variables and are therefore fixed at time t. However, the constraint determines the next period's capital stock, k t+∆ . Like the budget constraint, the constraint (BORR+) can also be "backdated" to the time before investment is made (see the timeline above)
Note that we now also need to include the constraint for period t, k t ≤ λa t , in the constraint set because k t is not a state variable at time t anymore.
C Closed Form Examples for Steady States with λ = 1
The main purpose of this Appendix is to illustrate the role of the autocorrelation of productivity shocks for capital misallocation and implied TFP losses. To do so, I specialize to the extreme case of no capital markets, λ = 1. The case λ = 1 is restrictive but carries all intuition for the more general case λ ≥ 1. The latter is analyzed numerically in the main text. By specializing the stochastic process (20), I can solve the ODE for stationary wealth shares ω(z), (22), in closed form. All aggregate variables in the model can then be obtained in closed form as well. I present two examples corresponding to two particular forms of the stochastic process (20).
C.1 Example 1: Feller Square Root Process
The following stochastic process which is known as a Feller square root process is convenient:
43 See Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) for an application in finance.
where ν and σ are positive. This is just the special case of (20) with a drift term µ(z) = ν (1 − z) and a diffusion term σ(z) = σ √ z. Importantly, this process is mean-reverting and therefore allows for a stationary distribution. The speed of mean reversion is determined by the parameter ν. The stationary distribution is given by ψ(z) ∝ e −γz z γ−1 , γ = 2ν σ 2 .
This is the formula for a Gamma distribution with both parameters equal to γ. The mean and variance are
I impose the parameter restriction σ 2 < 2ν. As can be seen from (46), this assumption ensures that the stationary distribution has zero density at z = 0.
This section is chiefly concerned with the persistence of productivity shocks. Wong (1964) shows that -similarly to the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (28) in the main text -the autocorrelation of z between two dates t and t + s, s ≥ 0 is given by Corr[z(t), z(t + s)] = e −νs ∈ (0, 1].
Under the specific functional form (45), one can solve the ODE for wealth shares (22) using a guess-and-verify strategy.
Proposition 3 Consider an economy with no credit markets λ = 1, and where productivity follows the stochastic process (45). Then the stationary wealth shares are given by
(The proof is at the end of this section.) The behavior of the wealth shares is similar to those for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in Figure 2 in the main text. In particular, as we increase the autocorrelation of productivity shocks above zero, self-financing becomes more and more feasible and wealth becomes more and more concentrated among high productivity types. Under the specific functional form for the productivity process (45), one can also obtain an expression for aggregate TFP. Using that the wealth shares are Gamma and that therefore TFP is Z = E ω (z) α = (γ/β) α , we obtain the expression
(50) Figure 7 shows how TFP changes with autocorrelation Corr(z(t), z(t + 1)) = exp(−ν). As expected, TFP is Note: TFP as in (50) plotted against Corr(z(t), z(t + 1)) = exp(−ν). Other parameters are α = 1/3, γ = 3, ρ = δ = 0.05.
higher the more correlated are productivity shocks (the lower is ν). This follows immediately from the fact that wealth is more concentrated among high productivity types so that there is less capital misallocation. Two limiting cases are also of interest: first Z → E[z] α = 1 as ν → ∞ (so that Corr → 0).
As already discussed, this limit corresponds to the case where productivity shocks are iid over time, also implying that ω(z) = ψ(z). TFP is then given by the (unweighted) average productivity which here equals unity. Second, Z → max{z} α = ∞ as ν → ν = ρ + δ γ , (so that Corr → Corr = e −ν ).
That is, if autocorrelation is sufficiently high, all wealth is held by the highest productivity type (here z = ∞) so that TFP is first-best. This is true even though capital markets are completely shut down, λ = 1. As in the main text, TFP is also convex as a function of autocorrelation. Proof of Proposition 3: With λ = 1, s(z) = zπ − ρ − δ. Using the drift and diffusion in the stochastic process (45), the ODE (22) 
